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THE HUNTING OF THE SHARK: AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
DavidS. Bogen* 
Alexis Miranda wanted his own butcher shop in New York. Regu-
lar lending institutions closed their doors to the young butcher's dream, 
but a gentleman named Alcides Perez offered him the necessary $3,000 
capital. The vague interest rate Perez requested was obviously large, but 
the initial repayment rate was only $105 per week. It did not stay so low 
for long. Perez raised it, first to $130, then to $205, and finally to $330. 
When Miranda complained that he could not make the payments, Perez 
threatened to hospitalize him. Perez also threatened to harm Alexis' 
family, or, still more terrorizing, to bring Miranda to the attention of 
persons higher up in the moneylending chain. Frightened, Miranda tried 
to make payments by obtaining meat on short term credit and then 
delaying payment to his suppliers. Having paid Perez $6,500, Miranda 
owed him $6,700 more. The dream had become a nightmare. Desperate, 
unable to pay his suppliers or the loan shark, Alexis fled to Puerto Rico. 
The shark patiently awaited his return. When he did, the shark found 
him and pounced. 1 
The predictable ending to his scenario occurred.2 The police caught 
the loan shark and he was convicted for his crime. Stories of crime and 
retribution rarely concern themselves with legal niceties, but the convic-
tion of this crook had a curious twist. It occurred in federal court under 
a federal statute. This is unusual because Congress was given no general 
power to enact criminal law. Normally, that is a function for the states. 
Here, the crime was perpetrated in New York by a New York resident 
on another New York resident. There was no showing that the borrowed 
money came from interstate commerce or that the repayment was used 
for transactions in interstate commerce. Congress had found that organ-
ized crime had substantial interstate relationships and used loan shark-
ing as a crucial step in its operations, but the statute did not require a 
finding that the loan shark be a part of organized crime, nor was there 
"' B.A .• Harvard University; LL.B. Harvard Law School; LL.M .• New York University Law 
School; Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland. 
I. United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1970). 
2. Assuming the scenario was written for television. In an age of enormous complexity, the 
movie villain seems as likely to escape. 
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such a finding as to Perez. 3 Thus, Justice Stewart concluded: 
Because I am unable to discern any rational distinction between loan 
sharking and other local crime, I cannot escape the conclusion that this 
statute was beyond the po\ver of Congress to enact. 4 
To a student of the Court, however, the most surprising aspect of 
this case is not that Congress decided to prohibit loansharking, but that 
a justice of the Supreme Court should find they did not have the power 
to do so. Justice Stewart admits that loan sharking may be a national 
problem which has an adverse impact on interstate business.5 As in this 
case, the high rate of interest may force a business into insolvency and 
thus hurt all its creditors. They in turn will be forced to charge higher 
prices and the effect will then spread throughout the national economy. 
For almost thirty years, the Court has recognized that "even if 
appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as com· 
merce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it 
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." 6 For thirty 
years the Court has stated that if Congress has power under the com· 
merce clause, its power is not limited by the Tenth Amendment. "The 
amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered."7 Yet Stewart bases his opinion on the proposition that 
"[t]he definition and prosecution of local, intrastate crime are reserved 
to the States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments."8 Even Justices 
Black and Douglas, selected for the Court to assure wide scope for the 
exercise of Congressional power, referred to the Tenth Amendment in 
connection with attempts to limit governmental power.9 When the Court 
3. Although such a finding would have had some basis in the evidence, particularly in view 
of Perez' reference to persons higher up in the moneylending chain. 
4. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 158 (1971) (dissenting opinion). Apparently Justice 
Stewart thought that if the representatives of the several states banded together in Congress to catch 
this shark, they would discover it was a Boojum and the states as political entites would softly and 
suddenly vanish away. 
"But oh, beamish nephew, beware of the day 
If your Shark be a Boojum! For then 
You will softly and suddenly vanish away, 
And never be met with again!" 
Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Shark, Fit the Third, The Baker's Tale. 
5. /d. at 157. 
6. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill, 125 (1942). 
7. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
8. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 158 (1971). 
9. Black in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,358-59 (1966). 
"One of the most basic premises upon which our structure of government was founded 
was that the Federal Government was to have certain specific and limited powers and no 
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held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied to a recreational area in 
Arkansas because some of the products served at the snack bar and the 
paddleboats used on the lake moved in interstate commerce, Black said: 
[t]his would be stretching the Commerce Clause so as to give the Federal 
Government complete control over every little remote country place of 
recreation in every nook and cranny of every precinct and county in 
every one of the 50 states. This goes too far for me.10 
Why does it go too far? Why have three justices of the Supreme Court 
recently sought to limit the power of Congress to regulate commerce? 
The exploration of this question forms the burden of the first half of this 
paper. The second half states the thesis that the Court should force 
Congress explicitly in the law or in debate to articulate the connection 
between its legislation and the commerce power unless the connection is 
sufficiently obvious as to require no discussion. Where Congress fulfills 
this duty, however, the Court should defer to Congressional judgment 
as to the necessity for adopting the law. 
I. LINGUISTIC LIMITATIONS 
The Constitution grants to Congress the power "to regulate Com-
merce ... among the several States." 11 Present day dictionary defini-
tions provide a maze of possible ways to interpret the~e simple words. 
Regulate can mean "to govern or direct according to rule," "to bring 
under control of constituted authorities," "to make uniform," "to fix 
the amount, degree or rate of, by adjusting, rectifying, etc." 12 "Com-
merce" runs a similar lexicographical gamut from "business inter-
course" through "social intercourse" to "mental or spiritual inter-
course" and even "sexual intercourse." 13 This array of alternatives 
makes mystifying any reference to the "plain meaning" of the provision 
divorced from considerations of intent and policy. But assuming that the 
most frequently used meaning is accepted as the "plain" meaning, prob-
lems remain. Does "governing business intercourse according to rule" 
others, and all other power was to be reserved either 'to the states respectively, or to the 
people.'" 
Douglas with Stewart in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,201 (1968). 
"[\V]hat is done here [extending Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state schools 
and hospitals) is nonetheless such a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the 
Tenth Amendment that it is in my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism." 
10. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298,315 (1969). 
II. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
12. \VEBSTERS NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 713 (1951). 
13. !d. at 165. 
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require the rule to operate directly on commerce. or may it operate on 
the market forces which determine the nature of the business inter-
course? In the absence of interference, the market "governs" what busi-
ness intercourse consists of. Regulation of market forces results in some 
degree of control over the business transactions. Thus interstate com-
merce is regulated by laws whose direct operation is on intrastate inci-
dents. And this approach to interpreting the commerce clause was set 
forth in the earliest cases. 
The genius and character of the whole government seems to be. that its 
action is to be applied to all external concerns of the nation. and to those 
internal concerns which affect the states generally.u 
The present interpretation of the commerce clause to include regula-
tion of matters "affecting" interstate commerce arose out of the experi-
ence of the thirties. It is enormously difficult to regulate the sale of wheat 
and its price solely by regulations at the market place. Fix a high price 
and the wheat will not be sold, fix a low price and the farmers would 
not grow wheat for market. Thus, the government attempted to limit the 
amount of wheat sold as a check on the market price. Even if the 
commerce clause were read to permit a direct regulation of intrastate as 
well as interstate commerce, 15 the growth and home consumption of 
wheat would not be subject to regulation. But since the language of the 
Constitution does not compel such a restricted result, it was easy for the 
Court to hold that regulation of home wheat consumption affected inter-
state commerce and was within Congressional power. 16 
Interpreted in this fashion, the language of the Constitution does 
not compel considerations of degree; it only compels a relationship be-
tween Congressional legislation and interstate commerce. In today's 
interdependent economy and social structure, every activity within any 
of the states will "affect the states generally" even if only tenuously Y 
Thus, at least in the context of modern society, the power to regulate 
commerce has no practical inherent linguistic limitations. 
14. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) I, 195 (1824). 
15. \V. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1953). 
16. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. IJ I (1942). 
17. A tenuous effect on commerce might be thought to be an insufficient basis for Congres-
sional power according to the maxim "de minimis non curat lex." But the Jaw does deal with trivial 
matters if the lawmakers so desire._ The maxim only indicates that intent may be important in 
countering an overliteral reading of a statute. But the framers' intent here is not a clear guide. See 
text accompanying footnotes 25-29, infra. Further, the maxim ordinarily applies where the court 
alone passes on whether a matter is de minimis. Here the legislature by enacting the statute indicates 
its opinion that the matter is significant enough to deal with. See text accompanying footnotes 33-
37, infra. 
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Congress' power is, of course, limited by the specific prohibitions 
on its exercise contained in the Constitution, but those prohibitions do 
not by their terms import considerations of degree into Congressional 
power to regulate commerce. When the Court sought limits for the 
commerce power during the early part of this century, it employed the 
Tenth Amendment. But the Amendment by its terms is not a limitation 
of power. Thus, Congressional power to enact statutes such as the loan 
sharking law-or to enact an entire code of criminal justice, for that 
matter-cannot be denied solely by reference to the language of the 
Constitution. 
II. STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS 
Professor Black has suggested that the Court too often has de-
pended on textual exegesis, and that it would be preferable in many cases 
to infer constitutional commands "from the structures and relationships 
created by the Constitution in all its parts or in some principal part." 18 
The Constitution makes constant reference to the states. Equality of 
states in the Senate is the only provision of the Constitution which may 
not be amended. 19 The state legislatures are given specific functions in 
the Constitution with respect to electors for president and vice-
president.20 The Tenth Amendment refers to powers "reserved to the 
States." 21 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against a State by 
citizens of another state.22 Thus the structure of the Constitution as-
sumes that states operate as governmental entities sovereign in their 
sphere. This reasoning is the basis for numerous decisions on intergov-
ernmental immunities. 23 
But saying that states must be sovereign in their sphere does not 
decide the extent of that sphere. Black's argument for the use of struc-
tural reasoning is not that it is more precise but that it turns attention 
to practical and policy concerns. "We will have to deal with policy and 
18. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as BLACK]. 
19. U.S. CONST. art. I,§§ 2, 3 and 4. 
20. ·U.S. CoNST. art. II, §§ 2 and 3. 
21. U.S. Const. amend. X. 
22. U.S. Const. amend. XI. 
23. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 113 (1870). Cf. New York v. United States, 326 
U.S. 572 (1946) and Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (Justice Douglas dissenting). It 
was this concern that the federal government was limiting the state acting in its sovereign capacity 
that led Douglas to raise the Tenth Amendment. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) in 
dicates that Justice Douglas would have no trouble sustaining federal legislation when a state in-
stitution is not involved. 
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not with grammar." 21 We find no difficulty in accepting limitations on 
state sovereignty in regulation of commerce where it is clear that the 
regulation has a significant and direct impact on commerce, even though 
without federal legislation, the state might be free to act. A commerce 
clause interpretation that would include regulation of all intrastate activ-
ity would still leave intact a state legislature with powers of discussion 
as a forum for the people of the state, with powers to tax and build 
structures for carrying out state functions, and with powers to legislate 
in many areas where the national government has not acted. The states, 
as states, would still have a significant impact on the federal political 
process, and the guarantees of sovereign immunity and limitations on 
state power would remain important in those areas where the state was 
left free to legislate. While it may be argued that the system of federalism 
established by the Constitution requires greater sovereignty for the 
states, that position is not compelled by the structure of the Constitu-
tion. By placing emphasis on the supremacy clause and the scope of the 
taxing and spending clauses, it may be argued that the states' political 
effect on national policy exists only through electoral qualifications and 
the institution of the Senate. 
III. LIMITATIONS DERIVED FROM THE INTENT OF THE fRA:\IERS 
In interpreting the commerce clause, it is fundamental that the 
intention of the framers of the clause be considered. It is universally 
recognized that the commerce clause was adopted in order to give the 
federal government power to prevent state tariff barriers. 
New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York. was likened to 
a cask tapped at both ends; and North Carolina. between Virginia and 
South Carolina, to a patient bleeding at both arms. Merchants and 
commercial bodies were at their wits' end to carry on business and 
petitioned for a general power over commerce.:~:; 
But was the commerce clause adopted merely to remedy the problem of 
state tariff barriers or were the barriers just an example of a more 
fundamental problem of state legislation interfering with other states or 
being inadequate for problems of national impact? The debate as to in-
tent revolved around the Virginia Plan of John Randolph which stated: 
Resolved: That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the 
24. BLACK, supra notes 18 and 23. 
25. A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 311 (1916). 
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legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and moreover 
to legislate in all Cases for the general Interest of the Union. and also 
in those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent. or in 
which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the 
Exercise of individual Legislation. 26 
193 
Resolutions based on this Plan were approved twice by the Convention 
and more restrictive proposals were twice defeated. But the Commit-
tee on Detail reported a draft enumerating the powers of the Congress 
rather than using the general language of Randolph. The shift from 
general to particular was not objected to nor was the commerce power 
as such discussed.27 From this, one scholar concluded, "[i]t was obvious 
that the Convention believed that the enumeration conformed to the 
principles set forth for the guidance of the Committee in the resolution 
previously adopted." 28 
The authors of the Federalist Papers seem to have read that intent 
differently. 
The plan of the convention declares that the power of Congress, or, in 
other words. of the 'national legislature,' shall extend to certain enumer-
ated cases. This specification of particulars evidently excludes all preten-
sion to a general legislative authority, because an affirmative grant of 
special powers would be absurd. as well as useless, if a general authority 
was intended.29 
These views may be reconciled by positing that the framers thought 
they had enumerated all the areas in which the general interests of the 
Union were concerned and did not want general language which might 
permit unnecessary federal power. The adoption of the Tenth Amend-
ment indicates that the framers saw a distinction between the powers 
necessary to a federal government and the preservation of state sover-
eignty in control of its internal affairs. The existence of such a line may 
have been apparent to an agricultural society where communication and 
transportation were still by horse or sail, and where tools of economic 
analysis were just beginning to be developed. The fantastic increase in 
swiftness and circulation of modes of communication-telephone, tele-
graph, radio, television-and the extraordinary speed and ease of trans-
portation -car, railroad, jet plane-coupled with the interdependent 
nature of our economic structure make such a distinction impossible 
26. I M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 21 (1911) and 2M. FARRAND, 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 131 (1911). 
27. 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION 308 (1911). 
28. Stern, The Scope of the Phrase Interstate Commerce, 41 A.B.A.J. 823, 872 (1955). 
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at460 (The Colonial Press 1901) (A. Hamilton). 
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today. There is common area where the necessary power of the federal 
government coexists with the sovereignty of the state regarding mat-
ters occurring within it. Since this common area was not a part of the 
framers' conceptions, it is impossible to look to the framers' intent 
to discover how it would be resolved. To the extent that such an overlap 
was perceived, the wording of the Tenth Amendment as a residual clause 
suggests it was resolved in favor of national power. However, the fra-
mers probably did not foresee that such a resolution could eventually 
lead to federal power to control all conduct within a state. 
IV. LIMITATIONS BASED ON POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Although neither the history, the language nor the structure of the 
Constitution compels a limitation on the scope of Congressional power 
under the commerce clause, they do not foreclose it. Judicial decision 
then is based on other considerations. Limitation surely is not based on 
protecting the individual from any particular legislation, since the state 
could enact it even if Congress could not. Nor is a limitation on Con-
gressional power necessary in order to achieve flexibility in government. 
Even if Congress had power to reach wholly local matters, existence of 
the power would not compel Congress to utilize it. Congress could decide 
in any particular case that different rules in different areas would be 
productive methods of dealing with problems. They could decide to leave 
such rules to the creation of the state legislatures. Thus decisions on the 
regulation of local matters would be based on the view of the majority 
of people in the United States through their representatives as to the 
relative advantages or disadvantages of leaving the matter for state ex-
perimentation or diversity. 
The true basis for limiting Congressional power is that it prevents 
the people of a group of states from enforcing their will on the people 
of one state where the interest of the group of states is weak but the 
interest of the dissenting state is strong because the subject matter is 
local. It is unfair for an outsider with little concern over what occurs 
within a state to make the rules governing such matters. Further, such 
a limit on Congressional power assists in preserving the harmonious 
workings of the federal system. Subject matter which produces strong 
dissension by a state will be left for that state to regulate unless it is 
essential to the health and well-being of the nation to override the state 
objections. 
The principle of preventing a majority from enforcing its will on a 
minority, where the interest of the majority is slight and that of the 
minority is strong, is not inherently limited to states. In fact, states are 
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less likely to represent cohesive interest groups than are other groups 
united by occupation, natural resources or geographical features. As a 
practical matter, there are so many bases for classifying interest groups 
that it is impossible for a governmental system to formally recognize and 
defer to all of them. The states then retain their function as identifiable 
interest groups by virtue of history and the difficulty of replacing them 
in serving this function. 
Recognizing that the policy is to protect the interests of the state 
suggests that only the state can object that Congress is without power 
to enact a statute. This would have enabled the Court to dispose of many 
of the cases in the thirties without discussion on the merits of Congres-
sional power.30 However, federal statutes adversely affect individuals, 
and the interest of the state may be violated although the state pragmati-
cally cannot raise this objection. 31 
First, the federal legislation may prohibit a practice which is so 
obnoxious that the officers of the state politically cannot object to fed-
eral intervention. If the Attorney General of New York argued that 
Perez should be freed, he might be associated in the public mind with a 
condonation of loan sharking. Lawyers condemn any association of a 
lawyer with the acts of his client, but the public has not entirely followed 
the precepts of the legal profession, and every politician worth his salt 
knows it. But federal legislation wherever consensus among the states 
finds an item or activity to be evil would require the federal government 
to use a great amount of resources. This in turn depletes the resources 
to which a state could look for use in the implementation of local policy. 
Thus, while no one law would harm state interest so clearly as to enable 
a state to effectively object, the totality of unobjected laws could severely 
harm the state's ability to deal with local evils. 
Second, the state may be divided over the wisdom of a certain law. 
The proponents may be willing to advocate and adopt it within the state, 
but not in the face of a declared national policy to the contrary. For 
example, proponents of legalized prostitution might gain control in Ne-
vada, arguing that it would better be regulated by the state than consid-
ered illegal and left unregulated. However, if federal law forbade prosti-
30. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); 
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 
238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); and Railroad Retire-
ment Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). Under this view, the individuals who raised issue 
of congressional power in these cases would have had no standing. 
31. This suggests, though it does not compel, the granting of standing to affected individuals. 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1956); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
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tution, the Nevada authorities might find it politically difficult to place 
Nevada in the role of invalidating the moral dictates of other states. 
Even if it were concluded that the state interest is not strong enough 
to be worth protecting where the state refuses to assert it, such a rule, 
requiring state objection before passing on the constitutionality of legis-
lation as exceeding Congressional power could produce difficult prob-
lems. There seems to be a presumption in Congress at present against 
passing local legislation. There must be a strong national need which 
may be tied to a constitutional power before Congress will act.32 If the 
Court made it clear that Congress had unlimited power unless the states 
object, the focus of discussion could switch from need for national legis-
lation to likelihood of local objection. For the reasons given above, this 
could result in taking away power from the local units to govern them-
selves. 
Further, the statute would be applied even though it seems a clear 
violation of constitutional powers. It seems unfair to punish someone by 
an unconstitutional statute simply because the state did not make its 
objection until a later case. For example, using Nevada again, the state 
may legalize and regulate prostitution. The federal government might 
then make it a crime. Thus, a lady of the evening could find herself 
arrested as she leaves the state inspection station. If the state did not 
intervene, she would be jailed for doing what the state condoned. If the 
state later objects and court strikes down the federal law, what happens 
to our first fille de joie? If she is released because the law under which 
she was convicted is invalid, is she entitled to restitution? What does it 
do to the morale and operation of the court to punish people who the 
judge believes acted within their legal rights? The uncertainty could be 
eliminated by requiring the state to intervene in the first test of the 
statute or be foreclosed from thereafter objecting. But such a rule would 
penalize the state which desires to change its policy after the federal rule 
is adopted. 
V. REMOVING THE LIMITS-ALMOST 
The foregoing discussion suggests reasons why a majority of the 
Court in the thirties and at least one member of the present Court have 
sought to place a judicial limit on Congressional power even in cases 
brought by private individuals. But it is the experience of the thirties 
which warns against adopting such a policy. There is an important 
32. Wechsler, Poliiica/ Safeguards of Federalism in SELECTED EsSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 185, 188 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler]. 
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interest in keeping Congress out of local matters. There is no adequate 
judicial procedure for assuring that this interest will be protected unless 
the Court permits anyone injured by Congressional legislation to raise 
the issue and applies consistent standards for establishing the boundaries 
of Congressional power. But the creation of such standards calls for an 
awareness of their function-they operate as a judicial statement that 
the state's concern with an activity is greater than the national need to 
regulate that activity. Any judgment on the necessity of national legisla-
tion inevitably leads to judgments as to the wisdom of passing such laws. 
Thus the Court passes on the wisdom of the legislature in the guise of a 
constitutional decision, although democratic theory would suggest that 
the wisdom of legislation is for the people through their elected repre-
sentatives to decide. 
This observation, which has often been made of substantive due 
process,33 does not dispose of the problem. For the Court is often forced 
to make judgments in constitutional questions which are ultimately 
judgments as to the wisdom of legislation. For example, restrictions on 
speech will be upheld if they are necessary to the security of order in the 
community, but they will be invalidated if the Court finds the interest 
protected too insignificant or the chances of disorder too small. Simi-
larly, definitions of reasonableness in search and seizure under the 
fourth amendment require judicial concern with "wisdom" of legisla-
tion. 
Where the Court passes on legislation in conflict with specific pro-
hibitions, however, it is using its judgment to protect an interest explic-
itly stated in the Constitution. As discussed above, the limitation of 
Congressional power under the commerce clause is not inherent in the 
language or the history of that clause and comes instead from a separate 
policy consideration. 
Further, the interest of the state in resisting national legislation on 
local matters is protected by institutions other than the courts. Of course 
the good sense which underlies constitutional guarantees offers some 
likelihood that they will be respected in the legislative process, but Con-
gressmen are unlikely to picture themselves as representing any such 
interests in opposition to other social concerns. The Congressman does, 
however, often behave as a representative of the state from which he is 
33. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,488 (1955). 
"The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, 
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought." 
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elected, protecting the interests of the state as a political entity. Where 
a majority does not have a very significant interest in obtaining passage 
of a law, the state's representatives are well situated to block passage of 
the law. Congressmen can use their ability to do favors or to obstruct 
votes on issues important to others in order to persuade their colleagues 
not to adopt a bill which would significantly affect a state's local interest 
but which does not have a significant national import. The veto power 
of the state is most effective in Congress. The same concerns which serve 
as a focus for judicial opposition to Congressional power serve as a focus 
for legislative opposition to extensive Congressional power as well. 3~ The 
difficult job of weighing the importance of the national concern reflected 
in legislation against the value of local control over local activities is not 
really suitable for the judiciary. The strength of these interests is much 
more likely to be reflected in the political process by which bills are 
adopted. Thus, the Court may be playing a wise role in upholding the 
statutes with which it is presented and not freezing some restricting 
conception of state sovereignty into constitutional doctrine. 
While the Court should sustain legislation by deferring to Congres-
sional judgment as to the weight of national and local issues, this does 
not mean the Court should abandon reference to the commerce clause 
as a touchstone to constitutionality. The Court must always find that 
the regulation affects commerce, but in the modern world it is inevitable 
that virtually any legislation will have such an effect.35 Further, where 
the relationship of the law to interstate commerce is not readily appar-
ent, the Court should require Congress to relate the law to its impact 
on interstate transactions. This could assist in focusing Congressional 
concern on the proper issues. 
Forcing Congress to face the issue does not guarantee it will resolve 
it on the basis of an appreciation of local interest as opposed to slight-
ness of effect on interstate commerce.36 The local interest may be dis-
34. Wechsler, supra note J2, at 189. 
35. The point here about interstate commerce is similar to Professor Black's comment on 
state action, "time and thought will make it even clearer that this requirement is always satisfied." 
Black, Foreword: "State Action" Equal Protection, and Califomia's Proposition 14 81 HARV. L. 
REV. 69, 100 (1967). 
36. Despite the bellman's claim, "what I say three times is true," Carroll, supra note 4, it is 
obvious that Congress' claim that the national interest outweighs local interest may not be objec-
tively accurate. It is surely problematic how far Congress will concern itself with basic constitu-
tional concerns. See Frank, Review and Basic Liberties, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 
122-29 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). The point is not that Congress' decision is objectively correct, but that 
assuming the existence of a tie to interstate commerce, Congress is the appropriate body to have 
final say on the strength or importance of that relationship. 
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counted for the reasons given in discussing the weakness of requiring the 
state to be a party in commerce clause cases. Effect on commerce may 
be a minor consideration in view of moral condemnation of practices.37 
But if, as suggested, the legislative body is a more accurate and, in a 
democracy, more appropriate body for determining the strength of the 
national interest, the Court should not interfere with its decision. Any 
review of legislative motivation where the formal ties of legislation to 
interstate commerce are made will become inevitably a judicial decision 
on the weight of national interest in affecting commerce. 
The proper role of the Court might be illustrated by Oregon v. 
Mitchel/. 38 The government could have argued that differing age limita-
tions for voting discouraged young people from traveling to states where 
they would not have the franchise, so Congress had power to eliminate 
this difference by statute to remove this discouragement from interstate 
movement.39 But Congress did not refer to the commerce clause as a 
basis for the 18-year-old vote either in the statute or in the debates and 
committee reports. The legislation's connection with commerce is ten-
uous and conjectural. Consequently, even if the argument had been 
made, the Court would have acted appropriately in not considering the 
commerce clause as a basis for-Congressional power. If the Court is to 
accept the legislature's judgment on need for legislation because of effect 
on commerce, it must demand that the legislature make that judgment. 
Stewart dissented in Perez precisely because the majority opinion 
failed to tie the specific transaction regulated to the interstate transac-
tions which Congress was concerned with. Douglas argued that a class 
of activities which affects interstate commerce may be regulated "with-
out proof that the particular intrastate activity against which a sanction 
was laid had an effect on commerce." In support of this proposition, 
he cites United States v. Darby,4° Katzenbach v. McClung, 41 Heart of 
Atlanta Motel v. United States42 and Maryland v. Wirtz. 43 But in each 
37. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). These cases illustrate the difficulty of any attempt to disentangle 
motivation in legislation enacted under the commerce power. Surely condemnation of racial dis-
crimination in public accommodations was universal in the Civil Rights Bill's supporters, but there 
was also an explicit recognition of the divisiveness of its effect on interstate commerce. 
38. 400 u.s. 112 (1970). 
39. The argument would likely lose as the Court in Mitchell seems to look at the power of 
the state to establish voting qualifications as a limitation of federal governmental powers which 
can only be overriden by a narrow government objective in protecting fundamental rights. 
40. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
41. Note37supra. 
42. Note 37 supra. 
43. Note 9 supra. 
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of those cases, all of the activities in the class were tied to interstate 
commerce even though their individual effect may have been trivial. In 
Perez, Congress was concerned with the interstate transactions of 
organized crime, but it did not restrict the statute to participants in 
organized crime. In the cases Douglas cites, the characteristic used as a 
basis for classification has a relationship to interstate commerce. Stew-
art argues that the court has not shown this relationship to exist in the 
case of loan sharking. This point is crucial. Persons may be designated 
as members of a class because they share characteristic A. That class 
may affect interstate commerce because some of its members share 
characteristic B. The classification, by including persons who have char-
acteristic A but not characteristic B, is overinclusive.H If there is no 
justification for being overinclusive, the statute should fall, since there 
is no need or utility in regulating individuals who have no effect on 
interstate commerce. 
The decision in Perez then should turn on whether there was justifi-
cation for the statute to be overinclusive. Justice Stewart does not deny 
the possibility that there is such a justification, he just says he does not 
see it. But there are sharp distinctions between loan sharking and other 
crimes, which justify the statute here. First, as Congress noted, loan 
sharking is a step in the takeover of legitimate businesses which is used 
to hide the illegal source of revenue of organized crime. Second, money's 
negotiable character makes it difficult if not impossible to trace its exact 
source. Since the loan sharking transaction was designed to hide connec-
tions with organized crime and its interstate nature is not readily suscep-
tible of proof, it is necessary to prohibit all loan sharking transactions 
to make the regulation of loan sharking by organiked crime effective. 
Douglas brushed by this point, quoting Holmes: " ... when it is neces-
sary in order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the 
precise thing to be prevented it may do so." 45 But the point should be 
the heart of the opinion. The tie to interstate commerce having been 
established, the Court should defer to Congressional determination as 
to the necessity therefore. 
44. See Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 31 CALIF. L. Rev. 341 
(1949). 
45. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971), quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 
u.s. 256,259 (1927). 
